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Abstract 
In this essay, I argue that the institution of journalism plays a vital role in 
informing citizens of a deliberative democratic society, and that to effectively fulfill this 
role, journalists must report the news objectively. I first examine the historical evolution 
of objectivity as it pertains to journalism. Then, I elaborate on some of the philosophical 
concepts that provide the foundation for objectivity. Next, I introduce John Rawls’ idea 
of public reason, which provides an improved understanding of the role of journalism 
within a democratic society. I claim from this that journalism must re-envision its role as 
guardian of the public political forum. Finally, I bring these various discussions together 
by drawing in the requirements that Stephen Ward lays out in his theory of pragmatic 
objectivity, and argue that these are necessary to help journalism legitimize its authority 
to safeguard this forum. In doing so, journalism can ensure both that citizens are 
objectively informed and that the public forum offers them a sphere in which they can 
effectively participate in the governance of their democracy. 	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Introduction 
 
 
Democracy falters if there is no steady supply of trustworthy and relevant news. 
– Walter Lippmann1 
 
It is a short step from misinformation to mischief, as we have seen repeatedly in 
recent policy debates. It is nearly impossible to have sensible public deliberation 
when large numbers of people are out of touch with reality. Without agreement on 
the facts, arguments have no foundation from which to build. 
– Thomas Patterson, Informing The News 
 
The health of any democratic society depends greatly on the quality of 
information available to its citizens. A democracy is governed by its citizens, and when 
citizens are better informed, they make better decisions about how to structure their laws, 
government, and the various economic and cultural institutions that make their society 
just or unjust. Ideally, a society should be “a fair system of social cooperation between 
free and equal citizens,”2 where everyone is better off than they would be fending for 
themselves. So, we ought to structure society in a way that benefits everyone — if some 
people are denied equal basic rights, liberties, and certain levels of justice, it is 
unreasonable for us to think that they would even want to live in this society. Therefore, 
we must make political decisions that we genuinely believe would benefit others, and that 
they would accept these decisions as well. The question that emerges from this is: how 
might we inform citizens in a way that helps them make political decisions that will 
improve our democratic society for everyone? 
In this essay, I will argue that the institution of journalism plays a vital role in this 
process, and that to effectively fulfill this role, journalists must report the news 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Patterson, “The Corruption of Information,” 1 
2 Quong, 1.5 
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objectively. It is not enough to simply leave it at this, however, as many publications 
today have a glaring misconception of what this ethical norm requires. So, in advocating 
that journalists should endorse objectivity, I will first examine the historical evolution of 
this term as it pertains to journalism, as to learn how and why many have come to this 
misunderstanding. Then, in Chapter 2, I will elaborate on some of the philosophical 
concepts that provide the foundation for objectivity, showing which ones we should 
abandon and which we should keep, so that we can reach the correct notion of journalistic 
objectivity. In Chapter 3, I will switch gears to an explanation of John Rawls’ idea of 
public reason, which will give us a better understanding of the role of journalism within a 
democratic society. Specifically, I claim that journalism must safeguard the public 
political forum, where citizens engage in rational, public deliberation. Finally, in Chapter 
4, I will bring these various discussions together by introducing the requirements that 
Stephen Ward lays out in his theory of pragmatic objectivity, and argue that these are 
necessary to help journalism legitimize its authority to safeguard this forum. Ultimately, 
by buying into the idea of public reason, by endorsing a more adequate conception of 
objectivity, and by using standards of pragmatic objectivity in order to pursue it, I believe 
journalism can give the public sufficient reason to legitimize its role as the guardian of 
the public political forum. In doing so, journalism can ensure both that citizens are 
objectively informed and that the public forum offers them a sphere in which they can 
effectively participate in the governance of their democracy. 
Sonnemaker 8 
	  
Chapter 1 
Looking Backward at Objectivity 
 
In order to determine whether or not objectivity is a norm that journalism should 
adhere to moving forward, we must look backward to its origins, considering both where 
it emerged from as well as what precisely emerged. Additionally, we can improve our 
understanding of its historical evolution by framing objectivity as it pertains to 
journalism. 
 First we must examine three philosophical senses of objectivity that are implied 
by the word, and which are relevant to journalism: ontological, epistemological, and 
procedural. The ontological sense concerns an object’s correspondence with reality. It 
ties objectivity (object dependence) to reality, and subjectivity (subject dependence) to 
the subject’s particular perspective — such that something is objective “if it actually 
exists, independent of my mind.”3 Epistemic objectivity deals with how we come to 
know these facts of reality, and thus draws the divide “between well-supported and not-
well supported beliefs [about reality].”4 A fact can be called epistemologically objective 
if it is discovered by way of unbiased methods of inquiry (i.e. without human error) and 
grounded in appropriately verified evidence. Finally, objectivity in the procedural sense 
focuses on how we make decisions in practice, specifically in the realms of public life 
and societal institutions such as law or government. Thus, “a decision procedure is 
objective if it satisfies a number of relevant criteria that reduce the influence of irrelevant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Meyers, 138 
4 Ward, The Invention of Journalism Ethics, 17 
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considerations or bias.”5 While these three senses of the word objectivity are discrete 
concepts, they are interrelated. In the following chapters, my attempt to revamp an 
outdated model of journalistic objectivity will reveal some of this interplay. For now, it is 
sufficient to grasp that a claim about something’s objectivity, philosophically speaking, 
may be directed at any of these senses of the word. 
Given this understanding of the word objectivity, we can now construct at least a 
“working” definition of objectivity that will guide this historiography. Steven Maras, in 
his book Objectivity in Journalism, spends barely four pages and makes only a cursory 
swipe at actually defining the concept. He rightly observes that this is a difficult project 
as it is a complex and evolving notion, and as I will show later, an attempt to draw hard 
boundaries is more likely to lose an otherwise supportive audience. That being said, 
Maras identifies three key aspects — values, process, and language — which, taken 
together, address the essential idea of journalistic objectivity. 
While there are numerous values that generally accompany objectivity, Maras 
points to three that seem to safely make the list, as identified by Everette Dennis: 
1. Separating facts from opinion. 
2. Presenting an emotionally detached view of the news. 
3. Striving for fairness and balance…6 
 
Process refers to the collective practices of journalists and editors that provide epistemic 
and procedural objectivity and “are central to the commitment to verification and truth 
underpinning objective methods.”7 While specific processes may not be identical across 
various media, publications, and forms of journalism, they all represent the application of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Ward, The Invention of Journalism Ethics, 17-18 
6 Maras, 8 
7 Maras, 9 
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objectivity to the activities of reporting and editing. Lastly, the language of objective 
journalism plays a critical role in convincing the reader that “‘the account can be trusted 
because it is unadorned.’“8 This involves using a rhetorical style that clearly, concisely, 
and accurately retells events, facts, and details. Further, as journalists generally try to 
respect the “invisible frame” — that is, their work in framing a story should be 
unobservable to readers — the language they use must be neutral enough in its 
connotations that readers do not perceive the reporter as the one shaping the story, but 
rather feel the story unfolding as it would naturally and independently of her or him. 
This is nowhere near an exhaustive definition of journalistic objectivity (I will 
delve further into this concept in subsequent chapters, and in several cases, show where 
the existing notions that Maras identifies ultimately fail us). It does, however, give us a 
focal point to bear in mind as we examine how the norm arose within the profession of 
journalism. We can envision journalistic objectivity as a metaphorical tree. Our three 
senses have illuminated for us the various parts or properties of trees in general 
(branches, leaves, roots, etc.) that we should focus on. Maras’ definition has identified the 
trunk and some branches that, at first glance, seem sturdy. Now, we can dig beneath the 
surface to trace its historical roots. Later, with a better understanding of the tree’s 
architecture and its structural integrity, my project will consist both of reorienting our tree 
to ensure that it grows towards the “sun,” as well as showing several different branches 
that are in fact sturdier and more useful for the tree’s growth.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Maras, 9 
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The History of Journalistic Objectivity 
Maras, as well as Stephen Ward in his book, The Invention of Journalism Ethics, 
and Richard Kaplan in his chapter, “The Origins of Objectivity in American Journalism,” 
all offer extensive accounts of the various roots of journalistic objectivity. Rather than try 
to offer an all-inclusive history, I will draw out several key eras and the relevant context 
from each, which together will suffice for my project. It is worth mentioning that the 
concept of objectivity in the general sense arose not with journalism, but far earlier. 
While it is beyond the scope of this essay to examine this in depth, it is beneficial to 
consider the prevailing societal attitudes that laid the foundation for its emergence within 
journalism. Philosophers have long "debated the difference between cultural convention 
and nature, universal and parochial standards, reality and appearance, objective 
knowledge and subjective opinion.”9 These have been topics of speculation from the 
earliest civilizations, to the ancient Greeks, to medieval Europe, and revolved largely 
around objectivity in an ontological sense (“what is true?”). Then, with the advent of the 
scientific revolution and the enlightenment, the focus shifted more toward an epistemic 
sense (“how do we know this to be true?”), with the emphasis being on proper methods of 
inquiry and on the use of verifiable empirical evidence (the scientific method itself was 
grounded in a commitment to unbiased standards of verification like those mentioned 
earlier). 
Around this time, the press began a massive expansion as well, due to a variety of 
factors. With the invention of Johannes Gutenberg’s movable-type printing press, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Ward, The Invention of Journalism Ethics, 37 
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information could be spread much more rapidly.10 Additionally, Ward notes that “a 
strong demand for a constant supply of news, a sufficiently large and literate public, 
cheap and plentiful paper, adequate transportation, a public sphere with some measure of 
tolerance for freedom of expression, the prospect of publishing profits, and a network of 
publishers and correspondents" all allowed for the development of a periodic press in 
Europe.11 It was here that the division between reports containing “just the facts” (i.e. 
news) and subjective commentary (i.e. opinion) first surfaced, and also where objectivity 
gained its first foothold within the practice of journalism. As publishers were incredibly 
susceptible to censure by both the state and church, they claimed adherence to standards 
of impartiality and fairness, and that their only intent was to inform. Yet in reality, most 
of what was printed was meant to persuade, enlighten, and moralize.12 Regardless of how 
objective it actually was, the disjointed and primitive nature of the press at this point in 
history prevented it from formally codifying these norms. 
In the 18th century, the jobs of reporter, journalist, and editor became 
recognizable. As daily publications reached wider audiences, journalism came into its 
role as the fourth estate, adopting a “public ethic” where it started to ground its work in 
protecting the public and its liberties and rights. During the 19th century, however, 
American journalism exhibited many symptoms of the deeply partisan politics that were 
afflicting the nation more generally, with publications clinging to a party's platform, 
endorsing its views and attempting to denigrate any opposing ones. Many outlets were 
openly partisan, and as Richard Kaplan observes, "viewed the world through partisan lens 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ward, The Invention of Journalism Ethics, 92 
11 Ward, The Invention of Journalism Ethics, 96 
12 Ward, The Invention of Journalism Ethics, 99 
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and fed its subscribers hyperbolic narratives of party conflict, triumph, and at times 
tragedy.”13 
Adherence to objectivity as a standard is not unique to American journalism 
(though it is largely an American invention),14 but I am primarily concerned with its 
development within the United States political climate. This is because the journalism 
that emerged out of the Jacksonian Revolution and, subsequently, the Progressive Era, 
revealed the truly inherently political nature of journalism, and eventually produced the 
traditional notion of objectivity, setting the stage for my project in this essay. Not all 
accounts agree that political sentiment was the primary impetus for objectivity, however. 
Maras dedicates the start of his book to discussions of three additional factors that might 
have yielded a formal standard of objectivity: the professionalization of journalism (and 
with it, the establishment of a professional ethic); technological advancements (namely, 
the telegraph, and the “unadorned” style of news reporting that it favored); and 
commercialization of the press (as advertisers wished to reach a larger, more 
heterogeneous audience, adherence to strict “facts" helped publications avoid offending 
the various groups that made up this audience). While these had an undeniable influence 
on journalism and may likely have created a perfect storm from which objectivity was 
bred, it was the inextricable tie to the public sphere and its accompanying politics that 
showed objectivity to be a necessary element of journalism in America. Indeed, Kaplan’s 
historiography contends that, "journalism’s professional ethic reflects the overarching 
structure of the political field with all its contentions about who is a proper public speaker 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Kaplan, 30 
14 Maras, 5-6 
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and what is proper public rhetoric.”15 As political institutions and our ideas about them 
shift, these shifts are evidenced in the press as well. 
Ward opens his fifth chapter, “Anticipating Objectivity: The Nineteenth Century,” 
with a quote from Clarence Darrow that aptly describes the waning sentiment of the 
nation, saying, “’the world has grown tired of preachers and sermons, today it asks for 
facts.’“16 In reaction to the unabashed partisanship of the political machines, Americans 
pushed for more egalitarian and directly democratic governance. This was reflected in the 
press as well in an era of “proto-objectivity," as publications started severing ties with 
their increasingly unpopular political affiliates. Additionally, at the dawn of the 20th 
century, penny presses became the first mass commercialized form of journalism, making 
the news available to a much broader audience. With these two shifts, the rhetoric of 
journalism changed greatly as well, from an "ethics of persuasion, which sought, in a 
grave tone, to tell people what they ought to believe,” to one “of popularity, which used a 
more accessible style to tell readers what they wanted to know.”17 Naturally, in seeking to 
increase circulation and appeal, journalism placed a premium on factuality and 
impartiality. Out of this atmosphere grew the notion of the press as something distinct 
from the messaging coming from political parties and government officials, “that 
journalists were independent professionals, who wrote impartially for the general 
public.”18 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Kaplan, 1 
16 Ward, The Invention of Journalism Ethics, 174 
17 Ward, The Invention of Journalism Ethics, 190 
18 Ward, The Invention of Journalism Ethics, 191 
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Traditional Objectivity 
It was against this backdrop that journalistic objectivity became explicitly 
codified. In the early 1900s, journalistic publications began to endorse a robust doctrine 
of “traditional objectivity.” By 1926, it had been formally adopted into the codes of ethics 
of both the American Society of News Editors and Sigma Delta Chi (precursor to Society 
of Professional Journalists).19 By the 1940s, as Ward observes, this doctrine had 
enumerated six related standards: 
1. Factuality: Reports are based on accurate, comprehensive, and verified facts. 
2. Fairness: Reports on controversial issues balance the main rival viewpoints, 
representing each viewpoint fairly. 
3. Non-bias: Prejudices, emotions, personal interest, or other subjective factors to 
not distort the content of reports. 
4. Independence: Reports are the work of journalists who are free to report without 
fear or favour. 
5. Non-Interpretation: Reporters do not put their interpretations or opinion into their 
reports. 
6. Neutrality and detachment: Reports are neutral. They do not take sides in a 
dispute. Reporters do not act as advocates for groups and causes.20 
 
The reporter, under this approach, was viewed as nothing more than a recording device, 
simply letting some event imprint itself upon him or her and then replaying the facts of 
the event to the audience. This austere commitment to a non-interpretive, detached 
presentation of the news went beyond mere empiricism. This made sense as a response to 
“a deepening doubt about, and disillusionment with, journalism as a source of truthful 
information and as an agent of democracy.”21 The rise of a commercial press (and the 
financial pressures it created), the increase of political spin promulgated by press agents, 
and an increasingly complex modern world all called into question journalists’ ability to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ward, The Invention of Journalism Ethics, 214-215 
20 Ward, The Invention of Journalism Ethics, 19 
21 Meyers, 143 
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report reliable, straight accounts of the news.22 The doctrine of traditional objectivity 
addressed these doubts by bolstering the factual adherence of empiricism with the five 
additional standards of objectivity listed above. 
 Despite its popularity, traditional objectivity suffered in the second half of the 
20th century at the hands of various technological advances and changing societal 
attitudes, particularly the advent of online journalism and the personal, interpretive 
coverage that it favored. This new media placed a premium on things like “immediacy, 
interactivity, sharing, and networking, limited editorial checks, and the expression of bias 
or opinion in an ‘edgy’ manner.”23 In conjunction with these new positive values, a 
number of negative critiques of traditional objectivity arose as well. Ward identifies four 
in particular: 1) that naive realism — an underlying assumption of traditional objectivity 
— became increasingly challenged; 2) that as many news organizations regularly depart 
from it, traditional objectivity may be too demanding as a norm; 3) that readers need 
analysis and interpretation, thus objectivity is too restrictive in rendering journalists 
unable to provide either; and 4) that democracy benefits more from a diverse, 
opinionated, interactive press.24 
Faced with these criticisms, journalistic ethicists have either abandoned the norm 
in favor of an alternative, more palatable one, or attempted to redefine our conception of 
objectivity such that it makes sense in today’s vast media landscape. Whichever road they 
have taken, we see that the old model has come to a fork. As Ward remarks, “traditional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Meyers, Journalism Ethics, 143 
23 Meyers, Journalism Ethics, 144 
24 Meyers, Journalism Ethics, 144-145 
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objectivity is a spent ethical force, doubted by journalist and academic.”25 In the 
following chapters, I will provide some philosophical motivation for the possibility of 
objectivity in the first place, and how we should think of this concept. I will then look to 
John Rawls’ idea of public reason as a way to better situate the role of journalism within 
a democratic society, and by doing this, show how journalists must take a similar 
approach in justifying how they report the news. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Meyers, 145 
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Chapter 2 
The Possibility and Practicability of Journalistic Objectivity 
 
As I mentioned at the end of Chapter 1, several serious critiques arose in response 
to traditional objectivity, and I admit that they present a dilemma for journalism: either 
drop the norm as a cornerstone of its practice, or somehow rebrand its notion of 
objectivity in a way that is compatible with modern times, attitudes, and technologies. 
While each objection poses a unique issue for journalistic objectivity, we can reduce the 
most problematic of these down to three “tiers.” The first is more or less a question about 
whether or not there are actually objective truths about the world to be discovered at all. 
While there are two types of responses that would rule out objectivity entirely, I will 
show here that these fail us, and that a third more plausible type opens the door for at 
least some notion of objectivity. Criticisms falling into the second tier typically involve 
some doubt about its practicability. They ask what kinds of truths might be objective, and 
whether or not journalists can, practically speaking, be objective in deciding which pieces 
of information to include or to omit in their reports (or in deciding how to present them). 
I argue that criticisms in this vein all stem from a faulty epistemology, and as such, most 
of this chapter is meant to reconfigure it in a way that is compatible with objectivity. 
Lastly, some simply question if objectivity is even desirable as a journalistic ethic. Given 
its obligation to inform the (incredibly diverse) public, I think journalism should simply 
ignore claims of this nature. Nevertheless I will introduce the idea of Rawlsian public 
reason in Chapter 3, which will give us more than enough reason to dismiss these 
objections. 
Sonnemaker 19 
	  
 
External World Skepticism 
Concerning the first tier of objections, which take a skeptical position on the 
possibility of objective truths, there seem to be three categories of possible replies: 
external world skepticism, relativism, or any reply that acknowledges the possibility of at 
least some objective truths. The first doubts or denies the mere existence of an external 
world. This is an extreme form of skepticism that essentially says: we have no ways (or at 
least not reliable enough ones) by which to confirm that anything we perceive actually 
exists outside and independent of our own minds, and thus we should not posit that a 
material world exists independent of our minds at all. The implication here is that there 
would be no objective truths at all, as every truth would be “subject-dependent” rather 
than “object-dependent.” 
This is best illustrated in the film The Matrix, where people perceive the world 
around them to be the “real” world — it looks, feels, smells, sounds, and tastes like it’s 
real — but in fact it turns out to merely be a computer simulation. This raises an 
incredibly perplexing philosophical question that we may not ever be able to answer, 
though we need not worry about it here. As noted, the characters in the movie — prior to 
being “unplugged” from the simulation — all genuinely believe that this external world 
exists, and that they are bound by its various constraints (i.e. the laws of nature), and as 
such, they act accordingly. It is only after the main character, Neo, learns that the 
simulation isn’t real that he attempts to defy these laws by flying and dodging bullets. 
Similarly, it would be absurd for us — prior to any compelling evidence that these laws 
don’t exist in our perceived world — to try to defy (or deny) them either. Until I am 
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presented with substantial evidence that says I should believe otherwise, I will (and I 
presume others will) take it that an external material world exists. While few people 
actually practice this version of skepticism, it is important to reject this concept in order 
to pave the way for objectivity. 
 
Cognitive Absolutism and Relativism 
Having granted that there exists an external material world, our next questions 
(which begin to reveal where the second tier of objections enter) should naturally be: 
what things about this world are true, and are they objectively, or merely subjectively, 
true? The first question is strictly about ontological truth, or how well a statement 
corresponds with reality. For example, the statement, “Venus is closer to the Sun than the 
Earth is,” is ontologically true, as Venus in reality is closer. While journalists definitely 
emphasize ontological accuracy, this is not where disagreements about objectivity 
typically arise — no one disagrees about the truth or objectiveness of statements like the 
one above. The second question, however, begins to draw out the divide between those 
who endorse objectivity and those who reject it. Here we must answer what things are 
true regardless of the subject’s particular perspective, and what things may be true only 
for certain subjects. 
We can frame the debate on this question in terms of the two camps on the 
extremes, cognitive absolutism and cognitive relativism.26 The former wish to say that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 I include the term “cognitive” here to distinguish from moral absolutism and 
relativism, which address the universality of moral and ethical theories. Here, I am 
concerned primarily with cognition and perception, and how universal our knowledge of 
the world is. 
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truth is absolute — that it holds regardless of the cognitive perspective of the subject.27 
Under this view, claims can only state objective truths or subjective opinions, and 
nothing in between. This depicts the reporter in a similar way as traditional objectivity, as 
an emotionless and detached reporter of the true facts. Absolutism aims for an incoherent 
“perspectiveless perspective,”28 a paradox identified by Thomas Nagel, which Julian 
Baggini draws on in his article, “The Philosophy of Journalism.” Baggini notes that, by 
definition, a view must be from somewhere, and thus there cannot be one true view. It 
makes intuitive sense why one would raise issue with this approach: if a journalist were 
to claim that their account of an event was the single, indisputably true account, we 
would rightfully be skeptical, doubting their claim to the omniscient perspective 
necessary for observing every detail of that event, and further, for selecting the “correct” 
details to present and to leave out. This is clearly not the type of objectivity we wish to 
endorse, though it helps constrain the discussion from one side. 
On the other side, cognitive relativists wish to say that everything depends on 
your particular perspective and so there is no objective truth at all — quite literally, they 
believe it’s all relative.29 This is also an inadequate view, first because it seems 
contradictory, but even if one can look past this, it yields wildly undesirable results. 
Baggini points to the contradiction in a quote from David Loyn, who says, “‘there cannot 
of course be a single absolute truth,’” to which Baggini responds, ”note the ‘of course.’ 
This is surely what any sophisticated person believes. But it must simply be a belief – of 
course – because to claim to know would surely suggest there is an objective truth to be 	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28 Baggini, 1 
29 Westacott, 1 
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known.”30 Even if we find a way around this problem, relativism says as well that what I 
hold to be objective need not be objective for you. For example, let’s say you claim that 
it’s true that the Earth revolves around the Sun. With relativism, I can now infallibly 
claim that — for me — the Sun revolves around the Earth, as neither of us have a more 
legitimate claim on the objective truth than the other. This seems to regress back to the 
very subjectivism that we tried to avoid by positing an external world. As Ward notes, 
“the idea of an external world is a sort of regulatory ideal — it sets up as a cognitive 
norm the pursuit of better and better knowledge of the world.”31 According to Ward, we 
cannot simply believe whatever we wish to believe, but are constrained in some way by 
objective truths of the external world. From this framing of the debate about truth, we can 
reasonably affirm that, while truth is neither entirely objective nor entirely subjective, 
there are at least some objectively true claims about the world, and in comparison to our 
other two alternatives (skepticism and relativism), we should favor this more palatable 
answer to our first question. Turning now to the question of practicability, we must ask 
whether or not it is necessary to draw a line in the sand — objective truths on one side, 
subjective ones on the other — as our answer will reveal why objections in the second 
tier appear at first glance to carry some force. 
 
Objectivity as a Matter of Degrees 
As do many contemporary objectivists, I argue that drawing a line like this creates 
a false distinction between fact and opinion. The epistemological assumption that the two 
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are categorically different was also a large motivator for traditional objectivity, and by 
getting rid of this assumption, we can rethink how these two concepts related to one 
another. Baggini takes cues from Nagel to show that there are other ways to understand 
objectivity than merely as a binary. Nagel does this by juxtaposing objectivity with 
subjectivity, noting that we can move from a purely subjective viewpoint, “which is 
entirely determined by the particular perspective of the individual,” up the spectrum 
towards a more objective one, and in doing so, “we expand our frames of reference and 
thus gain dimensions of understanding that go beyond our own perceptions of the 
world.”32 
Viewed this way, journalists attempt to maximize objectivity, not discover the 
objective truth. Thus, the goal of objectivity in reporting should be “minimising the 
extent to which our beliefs and accounts depend upon our particular localised and 
subjective viewpoints.”33 Indeed, our intuitive worry eventually becomes negligible as a 
reporter moves further up the spectrum: as the account includes more frames of reference 
outside of his or her own, the more truthfulness we are usually inclined to grant it. Of 
course, accounts that do a shoddy job of minimizing subjectivity may be only slightly 
different from those based on purely subjective perspectives. However, this also means 
there can be accounts that do a far superior job, and as such, objectivity is a matter of 
degrees. 
In thinking of this objectivity-subjectivity spectrum, we must remember that it 
does not span endlessly in either direction. On one end, we can reject entirely any claims 
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of truth that directly contradict objective, empirically verifiable facts about the external 
world. For example, “a water molecule is composed of two hydrogen atoms and one 
helium atom,” is untenable. Water is actually composed of two hydrogen atoms and one 
oxygen atom, and we have myriad scientific methods by which to confirm that this is 
how hydrogen is composed in reality. Thus, the former statement has no claim on 
truthfulness at all. On the other end, human fallibility and our limited knowledge prevents 
us from saying something like “the law of gravity is, has, and will always be a constant 
force in the universe.” But within this range is a multitude of facts, theories, opinions, 
and even values that we place on the spectrum according to the degree with which we can 
objectively verify their truth. As I will show to some extent in the remainder of this 
chapter, and more extensively in Chapters 3 and 4, there are certain criteria that 
journalists ought to rely on in order to accomplish this. The crucial point here is that, 
while no one denies the importance of ontological accuracy (how well does a fact 
actually correspond with reality), the emphasis is on identifying objective methods by 
which to verify their reliability. Determining a statement’s objective truth is a process of 
inquiry — by ensuring the integrity of this process, we ensure that the outcome of our 
inquiry (our various ontological claims about the world), are as reliable as possible.34 But 
before we can determine the methods and criteria that should guide this process, we need 
an understanding of how our cognition exposes us to the world. 
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An Interpretive Epistemology 
By tossing out the underlying epistemological assumption (of a hard divide 
between facts and opinions) that traditional objectivity was grounded in, we also abandon 
“a misleading metaphor of the journalist as a recording instrument who passively 
observes and transmits facts.”35 Recall from last chapter that one of the tenets of 
traditional objectivity explicitly prohibits journalists from injecting interpretation or 
opinion into the news. However, journalism is an inherently active practice, though the 
gulf between fact and opinion has prevented us from acknowledging that banality thus 
far. To help us reconcile these competing notions, we must to turn to what Ward calls 
“conceptual schemes.” 
Ward starts from a premise that I find compelling (as do other modern 
objectivists, such as Figdor36) that we do not ever directly encounter reality, but perceive 
it and come to know things about it indirectly through our internal representations of the 
various things that exist in the external world. From here, he introduces the idea of 
conceptual schemes: 
Truth is plural and fallible because incomplete modes of thinking inhibit our 
attempts to know. We base our beliefs and actions on our representations of what 
the world is like. The medium of representation is not the isolated concept but the 
conceptual scheme. A conceptual scheme is a mental grid of intelligibility — a set 
of ideas that helps us to interpret experience. Causal, logical, and hierarchical 
relationships link concepts to each other.37 
 
To say that we interpret the world via conceptual schemes is not simply to say that we 
use concepts when we think — it would be trivial to assert that when I see a car driving 
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by that I think of it in terms of the “concept” of a car. Rather, this claims first that 
interpretations are ubiquitous (all statements about the world are the result of us 
interpreting our perceptions according to past knowledge), and second, that we come to 
know the world (and verify this knowledge) “holistically” — not by an individual fact in 
isolation, but by many facts simultaneously, which we comprehend according to our 
existing conceptual schemes.38 To help say some more about this, we can continue to 
imagine how we might interpret our perceptions of a car driving by. Of course, not all 
conceptual schemes are equal: they vary in complexity (we have the scheme of “car,” but 
also just of “metal” and “glass,” or of “color” and “shape,”), scope (“cars” as well as 
“modes of transportation”), precision (“the acceleration of cars” is more precise than “the 
motion of bodies”), etc. Further, some schemes are merely positive, while others are 
normative — that is, some result in an interpretation that describes how something is 
(“the car is silver,” “it is an Audi”), while others cause us to interpret how we believe 
something ought to be (the car should be driving faster, Audis should be more 
affordable). Here is where we begin to see the separation of fact and opinion: every 
statement (including those above) is an interpretation, but we find some more reliable 
than others based on the amount of perceptual evidence that backs them up. Ward helps 
us differentiate these categories of statements, saying that “we tend to label a statement 
an ‘interpretation’ (as opposed to fact) when we are sceptical about its evidence. We tend 
to call a statement an interpretation if it is highly theoretical or when we are cognizant of 
rival interpretations.”39 Contrarily, facts like “the car has four wheels” are well supported 
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by our visual stimuli, and involve no competing interpretations that would give us reason 
to believe otherwise. 
With this epistemology, journalism is far from passive — rather, it involves the 
active interpretation of events according to the reporter’s various conceptual schemes. 
But it should be apparent from the above examples that nothing about this approach 
inherently prevents journalists from being objective in their methods of inquiry. The task 
now becomes figuring out how to evaluate these interpretations as to determine how 
reliable they are, and thus where they fall on the objective-subjective spectrum. By using 
the standards I will discuss in Chapter 4, journalists can do precisely that, and in doing 
so, they provide objective reasons that properly justify their interpretation of an event. 
This notion of cognition has substantial implications for our process of objective inquiry, 
though I believe that this model is ultimately far more consistent with how we actually 
engage in this process. 
I won’t spend much time justifying this move to an “interpretive epistemology,” 
as both Ward and Figdor cite findings in cognitive science that seem to support it fairly 
well, and heading further down that road would only derail my project here. I will say, 
however, that I take this to be somewhat of a practical necessity for journalism in today’s 
digital environment. Not only has the Information Age revealed how formidably complex 
and uncertain our knowledge of the world is, but also how much — through various 
technologies and media — we manipulate the information we communicate to others. 
Tools like digital photo editing and political fact-checking websites have both helped 
make us increasingly wary of how much disinformation there is, and how active humans 
are in facilitating this process. As such, I argue that it does an incredible disservice to the 
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acuity of news consumers to ask them to believe that a reporter has been passive and 
respected the “invisible frame” in her or his reporting. 
Rather, I think journalism will be in a far better position to recuperate the public 
trust that it has lost in recent years by beginning from the idea that knowledge is an 
interpretive activity, and therefore making its process one of objectively verifying 
interpretations in a way that the public can find both reasonable and reliable, and 
therefore justified. After a discussion of Rawlsian public reason in Chapter 3, my 
recommendation for the pursuit of journalistic objectivity will come together fully in 
Chapter 4, and will rely heavily on this interpretive epistemology. 
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Chapter 3 
Public Reason and the Role of Journalism 
 
 One of the most fundamental obstacles for objective journalism is simply that 
people have an incredibly wide range of worldviews, and thus have an equally wide 
range of reasons which they appeal to when evaluating whether or not interpretations are 
justified. This aspect of human nature is not unique to journalism — it creates significant 
problems for societies in general. A society, which should aim to be “a fair system of 
social cooperation between free and equal citizens,”40 can only establish one law and one 
government (that creates new laws and enforces and evaluates existing ones). Further, 
this law and government will govern all citizens of that society — that is, the government 
has coercive political power over its entire citizenry.41 Because there is a plurality of 
worldviews in any given society, this brings up two issues that must be resolved: 
1. Legitimacy: “In a democracy political power is always the power of the people as 
a collective body. How can it be legitimate for a democratic people to coerce all 
citizens to follow just one law, given that citizens will inevitably hold to different 
worldviews?”42  
2. Stability: “Why would a citizen willingly obey the law if it is imposed on her by a 
collective body many of whose members have beliefs and values quite dissimilar 
to her own? Yet unless most citizens willingly obey the law, no social order can 
be stable for long.”43 
 
These are two questions that John Rawls addresses in his work, Political Liberalism. To 
answer each, he establishes, respectively, his “liberal principle of legitimacy” and the 
notion of an “overlapping consensus.” While these responses are related, I will focus here 	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primarily on the issue of legitimacy, as it is instrumental in leading Rawls to develop his 
idea of public reason, and will help us re-envision the role of journalism in a way that 
prioritizes objectivity. 
 Rawls answers the first question by way of his liberal principle of legitimacy, 
which states: 
Our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is 
exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens 
may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals 
acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.44 
 
Because all citizens have political autonomy (that is, they are free), we cannot expect a 
legitimate government emerge from a constitution to which some reasonably object, as 
such a society would undermine that very autonomy. As Rawls scholar Leif Wenar puts 
it, “those coerced by law must be able to endorse the society's fundamental political 
arrangements freely, not because they are dominated or manipulated or kept 
uninformed.”45 
Since citizens must find a society’s basic principles to be reasonably acceptable, 
yet they have diverse and often conflicting values, citizens must appeal to reasons that 
they have in common, or else no agreement will ever be reached. Thus, Rawls claims that 
this imposes a moral “duty of civility” on citizens where the political decisions they 
endorse must be ones that are justifiable by shared reasons.46 This helps him establish his 
“criterion of reciprocity,” such that “citizens believe in good faith that the fair terms of 
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social cooperation that they propose and expect all to abide by are reasonably acceptable 
to everyone in their capacity as free and equal citizens.”47 
Given this criterion, Rawls rules out reasons that are limited to a specific 
“comprehensive doctrine.” A comprehensive doctrine is “one that includes conceptions 
of what is of value in life and gives life its meaning”48 — essentially, a worldview. 
Though such a doctrine may indeed be reasonable, it includes values that are unique only 
to it, such as a belief in Allah for the doctrine of Islam, which are unlikely to be held by 
citizens who don’t endorse the same doctrine. Those citizens will not find its principles 
reasonable or rational, and thus legitimate governments cannot be based on these types of 
values. Further, the issues that comprehensive doctrines address (religion, philosophy, 
morality, etc.) involve incredibly difficult questions that lead us to our plurality of 
worldviews in the first place. However, “reasonable citizens understand that these deep 
issues are ones on which people of good will can disagree, and so will be unwilling to 
impose their own worldviews on those who have reached different conclusions.”49 Thus, 
we need a set of reasons that are freestanding of comprehensive doctrines, so that citizens 
can offer terms for social cooperation that they can expect others (even those who 
endorse different doctrines) to find reasonably acceptable. This is where Rawls gets the 
idea of public reason. 
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Applying Public Reason 
The aim of public reason, given the above understanding of social cooperation, is 
to provide citizens with a way to publicly justify their political decisions, and thus 
determine “in front of each other” whether or not the institutions that govern their society 
are just. What then, is the scope of public reason? Rawls specifies that only decisions 
about basic matters of justice, equality, and liberty must be explainable in these ways. 
Further, he believes that public reason is required only within the “public political forum” 
— which includes judges, government officials, and anyone campaigning for public 
office — and not the nonpublic, “background culture” of society (an important 
distinction, though one which I will discuss later).50 
 With its boundaries defined, Rawls proceeds to describe what types of reasons are 
considered public reasons. These fall into two categories: reasons that guide public 
inquiry and political values that provide such reasons. Those of the former are meant to 
ensure that public inquiry is free, fair, and public. They include standards for the 
acceptable types of evidence, argumentation, reasoning and judgment allowed in public 
inquiry, such that all reasonable citizens can publically deliberate on the same terms as 
one another. The latter category is a collection of values that Rawls believes would be 
shared by all reasonable views in a democratic society, and thus could be relied on as 
justification for political decisions. He assumes that all democratic citizens, differences 
aside, would reasonably accept certain democratic ideals. Samuel Freeman identifies 
many that Rawls endorses, which include both values of justice as well as political 
virtues. Some that relate to justice are: “equal political and civil liberties, equality of 	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opportunity, social equality and economic reciprocity, the common good, the social bases 
of self-respect, and the necessary conditions for these values.”51 Political virtues, on the 
other hand, include ideas like those mentioned in the U.S. Constitution (such as domestic 
tranquility and general welfare), economic productivity and efficiency, and also things 
like “promoting biological and medical knowledge” and preserving the natural 
environment for future generations.52 Certainly, there are additional values that 
democratic citizens might all endorse, but this list will suffice for us to imagine how 
reasonable citizens could engage in public inquiry — that is, under mutually acceptable 
guidelines and by invoking only public reasons — in order to reach an agreement on how 
society should be structured. 
 To help illustrate a public justification that would not be in accordance with 
public reason, we can an example offered by Wenar: 
A Supreme Court justice deciding on a gay marriage law would violate public 
reason were she to base her opinion on God's forbidding gay sex in the book of 
Leviticus, or on a presentiment that upholding such a law would hasten the end of 
days. Not all members of society can reasonably be expected to accept Leviticus 
as stating an authoritative set of political values, nor can a religious premonition 
be a common standard for evaluating public policy. These values and standards 
are not public.53 
 
Conversely, that justice would be able to endorse gay marriage on the grounds that as free 
and equal citizens, people ought to have both the freedom to associate with whomever 
they choose as well as social equality. This purpose of this example is not to say that the 
right to marry someone of the same sex should or shouldn’t be established in a society 
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(though as articulated here, it seems as if it would be), but rather to point out which 
reasons would be acceptable under public reason. 
 Conceived in this way, Rawls thinks that through the process of public inquiry, 
reasonable, free, equal citizens will naturally do three things: 1) ensure all citizens’ equal 
basic rights, 2) prioritize these rights over other values (such as greater national wealth or 
cultural flourishing54), and 3) provide all citizens with means to effectively exercise their 
rights. Not only will public reasoning secure these rights as the most important ones, but 
it will also guarantee that citizens have effective means to actually take advantage of their 
rights. This third result is particularly noteworthy for our purposes here — in order to 
guarantee these means, Rawls thinks five institutions must be established: 
1. Public financing of political campaigns and ways of assuring the availability of 
information on matters of public policy, to prevent the distortion or manipulation 
of public reasoning; 
2. ‘[A] certain fair equality of opportunity’ especially in education and training; 
3. A decent distribution of income and wealth; 
4. Society as an employer of last resort… so citizens can maintain their self-respect; 
and 
5. ‘Basic health care assured to all citizens’55 
 
As for why Rawls assumes these five, Freeman notes that he thinks these same 
institutions are essential for public reason to be possible in the first place, as public 
reasoning cannot occur without a deliberative democracy. Absent these institutions — 
especially the first three — citizens would be unable to effectively participate in a 
deliberative democracy. Specifically, Rawls gives the condition that “if the political 
forum and the free flow of public information are corrupted by monied interests or by 
other concentrations of power… all parts of society cannot take part in the debates of 	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public reason or contribute to social and economic policies.”56 In order to ensure this, 
there must be institutions that, among other things, establish a deliberative, public, 
political forum and ensure that this forum does not become corrupted by concentrations 
of wealth or power. 
 
Journalism as Guardian of the Public Political Forum 
The question that remains, of course, is who should be responsible for this task. I 
argue that this is precisely how we should envision the role of journalism within a 
democratic society. If we examine who else might take this up as their aim, we see that 
no other societal institution is properly positioned to accomplish it. Public officials are 
obviously ruled out — by virtue of their holding the positions of power in society, 
citizens would constantly worry that those officials were censoring any deliberation that 
threatened their power. We see this frequently even today with authoritarian regimes that 
implement laws, fines, or other sanctions aimed at quieting the press. While it may seem 
that an effective division of power within a government could sidestep this worry, this 
only dilutes the power any one group of officials possesses, it doesn’t provide citizens — 
who are subject to the authority of these officials and the laws they enact — any 
confidence that the political forum isn’t merely subservient to the interests of those in 
power. Similarly, we can not look to commercial institutions — Rawls thinks 
concentrations of wealth can just as easily taint the public forum, and as businesses in a 
capitalist society have profit as their primary aim, it would be just as implausible to 
entrust protection of the political forum, for fear that they would constrain deliberation 	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just to that which served their financial interests. This poses a potential worry for news 
enterprises that have become massively commercialized in the last century, but this 
ultimately is not damning for journalism. 
From the shortcomings of these two themes emerges a common theme: citizens 
will always worry whether or not the institution responsible for ensuring that the political 
forum is free, fair, and public is in fact manipulating it to serve their own interests. For 
politicians, that interest is political power, for businesses, wealth. Every institution 
imaginable will have its own set of interests — that is not the issue. The problem arises as 
those interests diverge from citizens’ collective private interests, leaving them under the 
impression that the institution is corrupting the political forum such that it no longer 
furthers their private interests. The solution, therefore, is to try to align the institution’s 
interests with those of citizens, something we can only reasonably ask of journalism, 
whose “first loyalty is to citizens…” and as such, “must strive to put the public interest – 
and the truth – above their own self-interest or assumptions.”57 By imparting truth in its 
mission as well, journalism can even help citizens evaluate and refine their interests, 
especially in complex or remote areas of life which they’ve had few prior insights into or 
encounters with. James Carey eloquently explains the relationship between the press and 
the public, saying: 
The god term of journalism — the be-all and end-all, the term without which the 
entire enterprise fails to make sense — is the public. Insofar as journalism is 
grounded, it is grounded in the public. Insofar as journalism has a client, the client 
is the public The press justifies itself in the name of the public: it exists — or so it 
is regularly said — to inform the public, to serve as the extended eyes and ears of 
the public, to protect the public’s right to know, to serve the public. The canons of 
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journalism originate in and flow from the relationship of the press to the public. 
The public is totem and talisman, and an object of ritual homage.58 
 
We should not draw from this that journalism has carte blanche in its oversight of the 
political forum. It is only by its dedication to public interest that journalism derives the 
legitimate authority by which to fulfill this role. 
Recall from Rawls’ liberal principle of legitimacy why it is so crucial to 
legitimize political authority: if an institution is to govern people’s behaviors within a 
specific domain, those people must reasonably agree on the collective interests it should 
aim to secure (and the means by which they will decide these), else they would have no 
reason to support its authority at all. Similarly, in order to give journalism legitimate 
authority to “govern” the political forum, citizens (the public) must genuinely believe that 
they will be better off by allowing journalists to take this up as their purpose. And as is 
the case with political authority, citizens of any comprehensive doctrine must find 
journalists’ decisions and methodologies to be reasonably acceptable as well, else the 
integrity of the institution of journalism is undermined severely. From this, I propose that 
we rebrand the institution of journalism as the “guardian of the public political forum” (or 
“forum guardian,” for short), which states:  
Journalism should seek to be an institution with the legitimate authority to assure 
the public of the free flow of trustworthy and relevant information concerning 
matters of public policy, thus preventing “the distortion or manipulation of public 
reasoning,”59 which in turn allows citizens the means by which to effectively 
exercise their rights in a deliberative democracy. 
 
So, how does this definition stack up against our current notions of the press? 
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Within democratic societies, we have typically understood the press to serve three 
related but distinct roles: 
1. Electorate informer: first, the press is charged with gathering and disseminating 
information to the public, enabling citizens to effectively participate in self-
governance. Given the nature of the news it reports, it functions as “the primary 
source of information for an electorate which requires it to discharge even the 
most basic of its constitutive and legitimating roles.”60 
2. Public watchdog: with the rights conferred by the establishment of a free press 
comes the responsibility for it to “serve as an independent monitor of power,”61 
safeguarding members of society from abuses of power by the few who wield it. 
Journalists operate without “fear or favor” of those they report on, and thus are in 
a position to report critically on any abuses of power. 
3. Fourth estate: in the United States, the three branches of government, with their 
separate powers, are analogous to the three estates of English parliament referred 
to by Edmund Burke when he originally coined this phrase.62 As the fourth estate, 
the press acts as another check on the three branches of government by way of 
giving voice to the opinions of the public. 
Our new conception of the role of journalism is actually able to encapsulate all three of 
these functions. Thus, this is not as much a redefinition as it is a re-envisioning of the 
ultimate aim of journalistic endeavors. In fact, as forum guardians, journalists are 
frequently tasked with all three jobs. The significance of forum guardianship, however, 	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comes from adding the requirement that journalism derive its authority in a legitimate 
way from the public. In my last chapter, I will connect the concepts discussed so far by 
showing that, by adopting the criteria for objective inquiry that Ward lays out in his 
theory of pragmatic objectivity, journalists can justify their interpretations in a way that 
allows the public to legitimize their authority, much in the same way reasonable Rawlsian 
citizens legitimize political authority. 
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Chapter 4 
Using Pragmatic Objectivity to Safeguard Public Reason 
 
 Now that we have a more accurate conception of the role of journalism as far as 
its contribution to a democratic society, we can reintroduce the norm of objectivity as a 
means for journalists to achieve this end in their reporting. The purpose of Chapter 1 was 
to give a historical point of origin for journalistic objectivity and from that, a jumping off 
point for its redefinition. Chapter 2, by proposing a new epistemology, showed that we 
should actually think of being objective as the process of justifying one’s interpretations. 
While still desiring pure ontological objectivity (i.e. factuality), this approach emphasized 
epistemic standards (i.e. interpretations are ubiquitous: this is how we perceive the world 
generally, and thus they underlie journalistic activities as well). Finally, by introducing 
Rawlsian public reason, Chapter 3 showed us that in order to help citizens solve problems 
of political legitimacy and stability, journalism must also earn its legitimacy by appealing 
to reasons that any citizen could find acceptable. 
The main idea to bear in mind from the forum guardian definition is that, in order 
for journalism to differentiate itself from other institutions as the entity that ought to 
fulfill this role, it must practice its craft in a way that properly legitimizes its authority to 
do so. In the Rawlsian context, this requires that the public find it reasonable to endorse 
both the standards of inquiry as well as the political values journalism relies on. I argue in 
this chapter that, given our conclusions so far, journalists should adopt both the 
“objective stance” and the three criteria of objectivity that Ward lays out in his theory of 
“pragmatic objectivity.” These will ensure that journalists offer the most objective 
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reasons for “why they interpreted the news the way they did,” such that the public can 
legitimize their reportorial authority. While the political values that Rawls suggests 
undoubtedly influence their practice as well, I will focus here mostly on the standards of 
inquiry that the journalistic method ought to abide by. Ultimately, I will show that, to 
practice objective guardian journalism is to first assume a certain attitude towards 
objectivity, and then to test the interpretations one makes in reporting against objective 
standards — and make those publicly available — such that the public (regardless of 
which comprehensive doctrine they subscribe to) has reasons to find the account reliable, 
thus legitimizing the authority of the journalistic voice. 
 
The Objective Stance 
Before journalists can adopt Ward’s standards for pragmatic objectivity, they 
must first take what he calls the “objective stance” — that is, a general attitude or set of 
dispositions one adopts in their pursuits of objectivity — which help guide their thinking 
as they evaluate whether or not they’re meeting these criteria. He says that “there are at 
least four: dispositions towards open rationality, towards partial transcendence, towards 
disinterested truth, and towards intellectual integrity.”63 
In being disposed to towards open rationality, one accepts the burdens of 
proceeding objectively, such as using logically valid arguments and not making 
contradictory statements. Ward draws from Nicholas Rescher, who phrases it this way: 
“‘To proceed objectively is, in sum, to render oneself perspicuous to others by doing 
what any reasonable and normally constituted person would do in one’s place, thereby 	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rendering one’s proceedings intelligible to anyone.’”64 We see this idea at work in the 
scientific process all the time — scientists design their experiments such that anyone 
could replicate their process and reach the same conclusion. Open rationality helps 
journalists in a similar way, only it’s a reader who must be able to start from the same 
premises (i.e. the facts of an event) as the journalist and see how they reached their 
conclusion (i.e. the interpretation of those facts).  
Partial transcendence essentially means broadening one’s own epistemic 
perspective. We build on our own experiences by looking to those of others, and in doing 
so, we can rise slightly above our own limited (and purely subjective) knowledge of the 
world. To offer a crude analogy, imagine standing in a massive crowd of people at a 
concert, where you are only able to see those immediately around you. However, you can 
use others you to get a better view of the performers (by climbing on the shoulders of 
your friend, or watching the jumbotron next to the stage, for example), thus partially 
transcending your particular perspective. You won’t be able to gain a perfect “god’s eye 
view,”65 though your new view will be far less limited than one relying only on your own 
perspective. Journalists do this as well by relying on (preferably firsthand) sources, 
studies, and other types of evidence produced by others. 
Disinterestedness towards the truth is trickier as it is often misinterpreted as a lack 
of interest — as emotionally detached or not caring about the truth — which leads to our 
perspectiveless perspective from Chapter 2. Rather, we should understand this as having 
the discipline to step back and reflect upon the beliefs we hold, as to not let them 
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misguide our pursuit of the truth. Being disinterested means not letting our own personal 
interests cloud the truth, regardless of what that truth ends up consisting of, or as Ward 
puts it, “caring so much for the honest truth that one does not allow personal interests to 
subvert inquiry or to prejudge the issue.”66 A perfect example of a failure to adopt this 
attitude is with confirmation bias, which involves “the seeking or interpreting of evidence 
in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand.”67 
Readers are often guilty of this in choosing which news outlets to read and consider, but 
journalists can be equally susceptible to confirmation bias by selecting only sources or 
studies that reaffirm something they already thought was true, rather than considering all 
the available evidence. Political journalist Paul Taylor, who wrote for the Washington 
Post for 14 years, used a “before and after” test to check for this: 
When assigned a story that involves some substantial reporting, Taylor used to 
write the lead at the outset, before he had done any reporting. Then he would test 
that lead against the one he had written for real at the end of the reporting. If the 
final lead was too similar to the one he wrote before doing the reporting, he would 
know he hadn’t learned very much. That’s a sign the reporter may have only 
pursued information that confirms his biases, rather than overcoming 
preconceptions to find new information.68 
  
Lastly, intellectual integrity is simply to accept the fallibility of human knowledge 
and not claim omniscience in one’s reasoning, “to admit wishful thinking, to face up to 
the toughest questions, and, where necessary, to admit that one’s ideas are flawed.”69 Not 
only must journalists own up to their limited perspective, but they also must tell the 
readers if their reports aren’t conclusive, where there is a lack of information, and more 
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importantly, when they err. The truth is somewhat of a moving target: as new evidence 
becomes available, what we hold to be true evolves alongside it. So, journalists must tell 
the readers when new information suggests that the target has moved, and where we 
missed the mark with our previous shots. While there may be other tendencies an 
objective actor might adopt, the essentials of the objective stance are embodied in these 
four. 
Similarly, for Rawls, it is of vital importance for public reason that citizens are 
reasonable. To this, he says: 
Reasonable citizens want to live in a society in which they can cooperate with 
their fellow citizens on terms that are acceptable to all. They are willing to 
propose and abide by mutually acceptable rules, given the assurance that others 
will also do so; and they will honor these rules even when this means some 
sacrifice to their own interests… Reasonable citizens accept the burdens of 
judgment.70 
 
It is this idea of mutually acceptable terms that motivates objectivity as well. We 
accept our fallible knowledge of the world and the difficulties that arise in trying to 
answer deep philosophical questions. So, we agree to terms that others can reasonably 
abide by as to have a mutual agreement on how to proceed in our inquiry. Both the 
Rawlsian reasonable citizen and the journalist adopting Ward’s objective stance do this. 
This disposition is grounded in the same epistemology discussed in Chapter 2, 
which accepts that humans engage with the world by way of interpreting it according to 
our various, interdependent conceptual schemes. Thus for Ward, “objectivity is a fallible, 
context-bound, holistic method of testing interpretations.”71 This method consists of three 
distinct types of standards by which we test our interpretations about the world. Not 	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coincidentally, these correspond directly with standards we ought to employ in 
journalistic endeavors as well. One can definitely conceive of other possible criteria, and 
though I won’t consider those here, my discussion here will show that the idea of 
journalism as forum guardian seems to emphasize the need for these three in particular.  
 
Empirical Standards 
Empirical standards concern the ontological accuracy of statements, that is, how 
well do they correspond with the external world. For journalism, this means a strong 
emphasis on factuality in reporting, which involves grounding accounts in claims that are 
supported by substantial empirical evidence. It is easiest to illustrate this by showing a 
blatant lack of factuality. 
In a recent segment on her show “The Kelly File,” political commentator Megyn 
Kelly discussed the implications of a voter law — House Bill 1303 — enacted by 
Colorado in 2013. The law, she said, “‘literally allows residents to print ballots from their 
home computers, then encourages them to turn ballots over to ‘collectors’ in what 
appears to be an effort to do away with traditional polling places.’"72 The fact she 
asserted — that Colorado residents could print ballots out from their home computers — 
did not correspond well with the actual text of the bill. PunditFact, a branch of the fact-
checking site PolitiFact, looked into the claim and ultimately debunked its accuracy, 
stating: 
In 2013, Colorado enacted a law (HB 1303) that moved the state to an “all-mail” 
absentee voting system, among other changes. Every active voter gets a ballot 
sent to his or her residence, and they can choose to mail it in by Election Day or 	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turn it into a county clerk’s office. They can also still vote in person at a voting 
service and polling center… The ballot is mailed to them -- they don’t print it 
out.73 
 
This claim, in contrast to Kelly’s, was supported by empirical evidence (in this case, the 
text of the bill as officially published by the state legislature), and thus factually accurate. 
While it may seem biased on my part to cite a Fox News show as my sole 
example of empirical inaccuracy, I could (almost) equally have chosen a misstatement 
from MSNBC or CNN. However, as only one example was needed here, I opted for one 
from Fox News as t non-partisan groups frequently rank them as the most factually 
inaccurate of the major cable news networks. The Poynter Institute looked at a survey 
conducted by Fairleigh Dickinson University’s PublicMind, which found that: 
People who watch MSNBC and CNN exclusively can answer more questions 
about domestic events than people who watch no news at all. People who only 
watch Fox did much worse. NPR listeners answered more questions correctly than 
people in any other category.74 
 
Additionally, AMERICAblog cited a survey by PunditFact examining the veracity of 
news networks, stating: 
According to PunditFact, Fox News’ on-air talent were mostly false, false, or 
“pants on fire” 60% of the time. MSNBC ranked second in falsehoods, at 46% of 
the time. And CNN ranked a lowly (or uply) 18% level of falsehoods – meaning, 
CNN did a pretty good job getting it right.75 
 
Again, this is merely an example intended to illustrate the consequences of not 
adhering to empirical standards — one of the most basic responsibilities of journalism — 
and we should be deeply concerned that the most prominent news organizations in 
America are this consistently failing to do so. Almost by definition, news reports are 	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meant to be accurate accounts of reality. Therefore, accounts that report the opposite are 
useless in informing citizens — in actuality, they misinform people. Empirical accuracy, 
however, is not a unique requirement either of public reason or of pragmatic objectivity, 
but is something required of any coherent definition of objectivity. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, the idea is that statements are object-dependent (as opposed to subject-
dependent), so correspondence with the object in reality is one of its most basic aims, 
without with the entire endeavor makes no sense.  
 
Standards of Coherence 
Standards of coherence offer us a way to test the consistency of new information 
with our existing knowledge — they are epistemic standards. When we encounter a fact 
that seems to go against prior experience, we must decide if the fact is an anomaly, 
produced through human error or by incorrect methods. If it is not, we must revise our 
conceptual schemes to accommodate this new empirical data. 
Scientific discovery is rife with examples of this process, such as the 
abandonment of Newtonian gravity. For over 200 years, Newton’s laws of gravity were 
how the scientific community understood gravitational forces. Then, Einstein came along 
and devised his theories of relativity, which at first appeared as anomalous claims that 
went against everything physicists knew about gravity. So, scientists tested those claims 
against previous knowledge, and, upon discovering that Einstein’s calculations were 
accurate and his methods free of human error, they revised the obsolete Newtonian 
model. 
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These scenarios occur often in journalism: politicians make claims (about the 
economy, proposed laws, research findings, other politicians, etc.) that seem wildly 
counterintuitive, and journalists must verify those claims against prior knowledge about 
the topic. They can do this through a number of means, such as reviewing studies or 
seeking expert opinions (e.g. consulting an analyst from the World Bank on the validity 
of a claim about the potential impact on the global economy of a proposed tariff). The 
importance of having standards of coherence is to verify how — by what methods of 
inquiry — a statement came to be known, and thus whether including that statement in a 
news report helps or hinders the reader’s understanding of the event, and whether or not a 
journalist would be justified in including it. 
While this standard comes in part from our interpretive epistemology, which 
requires that we verify the reliability of claims about the world, it is also necessary for 
public reason. Standards of coherence help us filter out claims that rely on inadequate 
methods of verification. Often, the means of evaluation leading to incoherent or 
inconsistent statements are unique to comprehensive doctrines, such as “divination, or… 
complex and disputed economic or psychological theories.”76 Recall from Chapter 3 that 
our doctrines are diverse and often conflict, so ruling out standards of verification that are 
not exclusive to a single worldview, but instead are available to all reasonable citizens, 
goes a long way in helping journalists publicly justify their interpretations. 
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Standards of Rational Doctrine 
 Standards that focus on rationality are typically procedural in nature — that is, 
they offer criteria that promote being fair, impartial, and open in the process of evaluating 
our beliefs. As Ward notes: 
For the attainment of objective beliefs, it is important that all rational voices 
receive fair and respectful treatment, that the process of debate be inclusive, and 
the hierarchies of power do not distort deliberation. The process of deliberation 
should not “block the paths of inquiry” by preventing formulation of hypotheses 
or criticisms.77 
 
Thinking back to the objective stance, not only must we take on the burdens of 
rationality, but we must also be charitable in reconstructing others’ points such that we 
can partially transcend our own perspective, and further we must do so disinterestedly, 
not giving our own viewpoints preference over others simply because they are ours. 
Standards of rationality translate to journalism as well, providing guidelines for 
making editorial judgments and framing stories. We see journalists wrestle with this 
frequently in a process called “he said, she said” journalism. A residual consequence of 
traditional objectivity, journalists often frame debates between politicians in a dialogical 
format: a Republican senator A said X, to which Democratic senator B responded with Y; 
after hearing Y, senator A said Z, and so on. Journalists do this out of a noble intention 
and indeed to obey a criterion of rationality, that is, to represent diverse viewpoints. 
However, this often results in them becoming complicit in spreading misleading 
information, and as such, standards of rational doctrine cannot be taken in isolation from 
empirical or coherence standards. Instead, taking statements from authority figures and 
testing them for factuality and consistency can ensure that a diversity of rational voices 	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are heard in the political forum, and that from those, we legitimately arrive at objective 
beliefs. 
Standards of rational doctrine also help journalists practice public reasoning. 
Ward directly references Rawls in this section of his book, saying, “public reason is the 
means by which a society fairly and openly discusses fundamental political issues. Rawls 
argues that citizens in a pluralistic democracy must agree on the sort of reasons that they 
will give each other.”78 As the press helps set the tone for deliberation in the public 
political forum, these standards allow it to favor rational voices over irrational ones, but 
in a way that does not distort them or give preference to one over the other for irrelevant 
reasons. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
 Collectively, Ward’s objective stance and his three types of standards provide 
journalists with a way to justify their practice, to give the public acceptable reasons for 
endorsing the interpretations made in their reporting. Why do these reasons provide 
legitimate justification? Ward’s standards of pragmatic objectivity function in an 
analogous way to Rawls’ public reasons: they offer standards that any citizen (regardless 
of their comprehensive moral, religious, or philosophical doctrine) would find reasonable 
to endorse. Put another way, were any member of society to place themselves in the 
shoes of the journalist and attempt to replicate the interpretive process, they too would 
find the process reasonable. By objectively verifying his or her interpretations, they 
journalist gives justification for those reasons that do not just depend on his or her own 
conceptual schemes, but on standards of factuality, coherence, and rationality, which are 
available to any reasonable person. Phrased like this, we see resemblances as well to the 
scientific method (it is no coincidence that scientific inquiry is referenced several times in 
this paper). 
In general, there is a strong correlation between the believability of claims about 
the world and the quality and quantity of reasons provided for supporting those claims. If 
only one person is able to conclude something about the world and can only offer purely 
subjective reasons for how they came to believe that, others would be unlikely to believe 
his or her claim. This is not to say that the majority opinion is always indicative of the 
most objective or reasonable beliefs — in fact, it is often a very poor indicator of them — 
but simply that by providing publicly available and accepted justifications for our 
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interpretations (whether they pertain to matters of political justice, scientific phenomena, 
or newsworthy events), we give others better reason to endorse them as well. 
Further, our interpretations are ubiquitous — all human knowledge consists of 
interpreting things through our various conceptual schemes. Thus, our knowledge of the 
world runs a wide spectrum. On one end, we have a barrier of “minimum 
correspondence” with the external world; statements that lie beyond this point we dub 
“false” insofar as they run counter to, or contradict everything we know. On the other, we 
have cold, hard facts that we take to be incorrigible; yet, these too are factual as far as we 
know — the external world far outpaces our understanding of it, and thus there is always 
room to revise our beliefs. But in between these extremes is a gradient of interpretations 
that include not just facts, but also theories, analyses, political values, moral values, 
religious values, and infinitely more subsets between each of those. What places them in 
their proper order on the spectrum is not some categorical difference, but the degree to 
which others may reasonably come to believe or value them as well. 
Thus, the aim of journalism is to give people reasons to believe its accounts of 
events in the external world — public reasons that all reasonable citizens can look to in 
order to determine whether or not the account accurately depicts reality. This lets citizens 
come to new understandings of the parts of the world that lie beyond their immediate 
horizons, lets them use that new knowledge to better participate in the public political 
forum of a deliberative democracy, and it lets journalism safeguard that forum from 
distortion or manipulation in ways that prevent citizens from exercising their rights. 
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